I. INTRODUCTION
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 8-K offers a unique platform for corporate political speech. The requirement that publicly traded firms issue real-time disclosures of material changes to their expected results 1 both requires and allows companies to publicly comment on the financial impact of newly enacted laws. Our unique empirical study examines one such disclosure episode that immediately followed the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), on March 23, 2010.2 Following passage of that historic legislation, close to 150 companies wrote off a total of $5 billion against their 2010 earnings, triggered by just one relatively minor provision of the ACA. 3 These write-offs signaled the potentially crippling impact of the entirety of the ACA on employers and the feasibility of continuing to offer employee health insurance plans. Officials in Congress and President Obama's Administration quickly rebuked the firms for unnecessarily alarming the public about the negative effects of the Administration's signature legislation. 4 The Supreme Court's June 28, 2012 decision in National Federation ofIndependent Business v. Sebelius, 5 upholding virtually all of the ACA, means that the law is here to stay, barring dramatic changes in the November 2012 elections and repeal of the legislation. Meanwhile, employers continue to express serious concerns about the future of employer-based health insurance. 6 We recognize that SEC-compelled speech may, [Vol. 38:2
Employers United the subsidy tax-free but may no longer take the deduction. 20 The narrative that the Obama Administration and ACA proponents told was that the firms' high-dollar write-offs were nothing more than sour grapes and disingenuous attempts to perpetuate the partisan battle, even after the ACA was finally and validly enacted.
2 1 Our study tells a different story. First, we establish that the RDS write-offs were required under applicable SEC rules and consistent with financial accounting standards. Those firms issuing more prominent SEC disclosure statements regarding the RDS generally were the firms that experienced greater financial impact as a result of the change. Second, we note that a high percentage of firms issuing post-ACA Form 8-Ks actively and publicly opposed the RDS tax change proposal before it was enacted. Even if firms' SEC disclosures had the desired purpose and effect of reasserting their political objections to the ACA, their statements were also accurate, required, and expected. The Administration's response, more than the firms' disclosures, seem to have been politically motivated as an attempt to suppress corporate political speech critical of the newly enacted reforms.
Part II of this Article explains the historical and legal background of the RDS controversy. Part III describes the SEC and Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) rules that required the firms' disclosures. Part IV presents our empirical methodology and findings. Part V considers the broader implications of Form 8-K as a corporate political speech venue and the government's attempts to control political messaging around the ACA.
II. BACKGROUND
We begin with a brief history of employer-based health insurance, with particular emphasis on retiree prescription drug plans. Next, we explain the statutory enactment of the RDS in 2003 and the tax code change to the RDS in 2010, under the ACA. Finally, we discuss the political controversy that arose following several prominent firms' post-ACA-enactment SEC Form 8-K filings, reporting significant expected earnings shortfalls due to the RDS tax change.
A. BriefHistory ofRetiree Drug Plans
Employer-based health insurance is a product of post-World War II wage-hour laws, 22 favorable tax treatment for employee benefits, 23 and union pressure on particular sponsored programs). 
See 26 U.S.C. § 139A (2006) (as amended) (detailing the elimination of the deduction).

See infra
explaining how the tax code creates incentives for taxpayers to acquire health coverage through employment-related groups); see also Hyman & Hall, supra note 22 (stating that the tax code was an impetus for the increase in employment-based coverage); Cancelosi, supra note 22, at 89 (describing the subsidy on employee benefits provided by the tax code).
industries. 24 Retiree health insurance initially was a relatively inexpensive add-on to employer health plans and an easy concession to unions. The Big Three automakers were among the first companies, in 1967, to offer retiree health benefits. 25 The federal Medicare program, enacted in 1965, provides comprehensive health coverage for retirees aged 65 and older. 26 Accordingly, employers could supplement Medicare-eligible retirees' federal coverage at relatively little expense and provide short-term coverage to early retirees until they became Medicare-eligible. 27 As the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits layoffs that target older workers, firms use generous retirement benefits as a carrot to encourage aging workers to retire.
8
Employer-based prescription drug coverage was an especially valuable supplement because Medicare did not cover outpatient prescription drugs until relatively recently.29 As pharmacological treatments increasingly are used to manage chronic conditions suffered by many retirement-aged individuals, prescription drug coverage became more important to retirees and at the same time, drug plans became more expensive for employers.
3 0 In general, employers' overall health care costs, for both active and retired workers, have continued to rise steadily in recent years. 3 1 One study noted that " [d] ue to rising costs, some employers and employees have been economically forced to abandon employer-sponsored health benefits entirely."
32 Small employers, in particular, have difficulty bearing the costs of providing health insurance to employees. 33 Retiree health plans are more vulnerable than plans for active workers. To support retiree plans, employers typically impose greater cost-sharing obligations, more restrictive drug-plan formularies, benefits caps, and increased time-in-service eligibility criteria. 34 The increased costs of providing retiree prescription drug coverage has caused some employers to eliminate those benefits altogether. 35 The number of large employers
See
Hyman & Hall, supra note 22, at 25 (arguing that unions were a factor in the rise in employee benefits); Cancelosi, supra note 22, at 88 (describing union negotiation efforts that led to an increase in employer-provided health benefits).
25. Cancelosi, supra note 22, at 106. 3-4 (2012) , available at www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ EBRI IB 01-2010_No338_Ret-hlth.pdf (explaining that many employers have limited access to health benefits for retirees); see also Ellen E. Schultz, Facing Health-Plan Cuts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304331204577354294143782520.html (describing the rising costs for health insurance imposed on retirees); LARGE EMPLOYERS, supra note 6, at 3 (noting "top strategies" that employers use to control retiree health care costs include "capping company contributions (45%), increasing employee contributions (3 1%), and eliminating coverage for future retirees (28%)"). 42 There was considerable concern that the creation of the Medicare "Part D" drug benefit would incentivize employers to "dump" their retirees into the new Medicare program, thereby decreasing their own health care costs and increasing the federal program's costs. 43 President Bush vowed to keep the price tag for the new Part D to $400 billion. 44 To that end, the MMA included a 28% subsidy to employers that maintained, or began offering, Part D actuarially equivalent prescription drug benefit plans to their retirees. For participating employers, the 28% RDS was both non-includible as taxable income and deductible as a business expense. 45 (describing the operation of the federal subsidy); Cancelosi, supra note 22, at 122 (describing the provision's cost firms only 370 after taxes. 46 The RDS generally was quite successful in maintaining employer-provided retiree drug coverage. In 2006, the year that Part D took effect, 78% of employers planned to accept the federal RDS and provide drug coverage to their Medicare-eligible retirees. 47 In fact, several employers threatened to drop retirees' other health benefits if they opted to enroll in Medicare Part D instead of employer plans. 48 Employers did not want to provide health benefits without the benefit of the generous federal drug plan subsidy. Since 2006, the federal government has paid $14.6 billion directly to employers through the RDS program. 49 The ACA retained the 28% RDS and its treatment as pre-tax dollars but repealed the deductibility of the RDS, effective 2013.50 Employers may still deduct the 72% contribution of their own funds that they make toward retiree drug plans but may no longer deduct the 28% received as a subsidy from the federal government. From the government's perspective, the change simply closed a loophole and prevented doubledipping by employers. 5 1 From employers' perspectives, the very favorable tax treatment was a deliberate part of the MMA's anti-dumping design.
42 U.S.C. § § 402(a)(3), 416(c)
(
52
By way of comparison, the ACA added another, even more generous, 80% federal subsidy for employers offering health insurance benefits to early retirees not yet eligible for Medicare. 53 The insurance market reforms take effect. The ACA specifies that the early retiree reinsurance subsidy is excluded from the employer's gross income but is silent on deductibility.
5 5 In the absence of an express declaration in the statute, some posit that the subsidy would be deductible. 56 A similar interpretation in the face of legislative silence supported the historical tax treatment for the RDS subsidy.
57
As originally enacted on March 23, 2010, the ACA's change in RDS tax treatment would have taken effect on December 31, 2010. Under the Reconciliation Act, signed by President Obama on March 30, 2010, the effective date for the RDS tax change was delayed until December 31, 2012.58 Accordingly, until 2013, employers may continue to receive the RDS, exclude it from taxable income, and deduct the full cost of the retiree drug plan, including the 28% subsidy. 59 The change effectively increases an employer's income tax liability and thereby, the cost of providing prescription drug coverage to retirees. 6 8 The Committee asserted that the 8-K write-offs appeared to conflict with independent analyses, which predicted that the ACA will expand coverage and bring down costs. 69 The Committee also interviewed representatives of various trade organizations and interested parties, including the Business Roundtable, Financial Accounting Standards Board, health economists, and officials from the federal Centers on Medicare and Medicaid Services. 70 The firms maintained that the filings were proper. A Caterpillar spokesman explained, "[w]e take a very prudent and cautious approach as it relates to all of our filings with the SEC and other regulatory agencies." 7 1 In response to the Committee's request, the firms produced hundreds of pages of documents relating to the write-down issue.72 On April 14, 2010, the Committee cancelled the hearing the day before it was scheduled, with the suggestion that " [t] here was consensus among the business executives" that the financial impact of the ACA could not be accurately assessed until fully implemented. 73 Based on preliminary investigations, the Committee concluded that the companies' one-time charges were proper under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and SEC rules, but perhaps still misleading. 74 The Committee noted that the firms derived the large numbers reported in their 8 employers to report retiree health benefits on an accrual rather than cash basis, 75 and FAS 109, which requires employers to recognize the estimated future tax effects resulting from a new tax law in the year of the law's enactment. 76 Firms receiving the RDS had already "booked" the deferred tax benefit by recording an asset on their balance sheets, estimating the amount based on the number of years that the companies anticipated offering prescription drug benefits to their retirees. Some companies estimated to "infinity," while others had shorter horizons. 77 When the ACA eliminated the deductibility of the subsidy, firms were required to write off the entire value of the related tax assets in the current year.
78
Though proper, the Committee concluded that the firms' SEC filings could be "misconstrued" because the tax change will not take effect until 2013, and the filings did not reflect annual cash-flow impacts. 79 Moreover, the Committee noted that several companies' documents and representatives suggested that, if implemented correctly, "the overall impact of the law on large employers could be beneficial." 8 0
The Energy and Commerce Committee Minority Staff separately reviewed the companies' documents and produced a memo concluding that the SEC filings were not only proper but had been forecast. 8 1 The Minority Staff memo cited various documents from the companies and various trade groups, alerting Congress of the effects of the proposed RDS tax change and FAS rules that would require the write-offs. 8 2 The
Minority Staff's observations were not limited to the RDS issue. Its memo further noted that each of the five companies produced documents expressing concern about increased costs and long-term viability of providing not only retiree but also active employee benefits as a result of the ACA. 83 The overall suggestion was that even if the 8-K disclosures were auguring worse financial impacts on employers still to come, they were not inappropriate or unwarranted. 83. See id. at 3-4 (explaining that the legislation would increase $100 million in the first year for Caterpillar alone and the pressure this would have on covering retired and current employees); see also Hyman, supra note 73, at 15-16 (noting that all four companies were "running the numbers" to decide whether to continue offering employee health benefits in light of the ACA).
84. See also Hyman, supra note 73, at 16 (explaining that there are more factors than just money that make employers adopt the EBC).
III. SEC REQUIREMENTS AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
This Part describes SEC disclosure requirements, including Form 8-K, and Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) applicable to the firms' RDS-related write-offs. As both the majority and minority members of the congressional committee concluded, the firms' filings were consistent with SEC and GAAP requirements. 85 We note, however, these requirements allowed firms to signal objection to federal health reform through the novel speech venue of SEC filings. The RDS tax change, in particular, required rapid disclosure, current-year write-offs, and accrual-basis accounting, a confluence of factors that required, but also allowed, firms to report alarming reductions in their post-ACA earnings reports.
A. SEC Disclosure Requirements
Following the market crash in 1929, the federal government passed the Securities Act of 1933, which was "designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." 8 6 The following year, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 87 imposing disclosure requirements on a continuous basis. The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 made them applicable to a much larger category of issuers.
8 8 The goal of providing investors with current information on an ongoing basis is accomplished with periodic scheduled reports as well as current interim reports when triggered by certain material events. 
Current Reports: Form 8-K
Certain information, triggered by various events in the interim between Forms 10-K and 10-Q filings, must be disclosed on Form 8-K.101 Form 8-K is used to report "extraordinary" corporate events, such as bankruptcy, acquisition or disposition of significant assets, change in fiscal year, or change in control of the company. There are 27 mandatory disclosure items, 102 including registrant's business and operations, financial information, securities and trading markets, matters relating to accountants and financial statements, corporate governance and management, asset-backed securities, regulation fair disclosure (FD), financial statements and exhibits for businesses acquired, pro forma financial information, and shell company transactions.
103 All mandatory information regarding the firm's business, risk factors, properties, and legal proceedings. Id. Part II provides audited financial statements, the management's discussion and analysis, quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk, and income and balance sheet data. Id Part III incorporates information regarding the company's directors, officers, and corporate governance as well as principal fees and services. Id. Part IV contains schedules to the financial statements as well as various exhibits. Id.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a(a). 104 In response to corporate scandals, such as Enron, congressional and SEC policies emphasize more rapid and expansive disclosure of information regarding public companies' financial conditions and operations.1 05 The trigger for 8-K reporting is "materiality," specifically, "information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer."
Form
106 SEC guidance cautions companies against relying on "rules of thumb," such as a five percent threshold, for determining materiality. Rather, the standard is nuanced and requires judgment. "A matter is 'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important." 10 7 In defining materiality, the SEC relies on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. that facts are "material" when there is a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."l 0 8 Further, if a reasonable investor would view the fact as having significantly altered the "total mix" of available information, the fact is considered material.109 The SEC specifies "that financial management and the auditor must consider both 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' factors in assessing an item's materiality," and affirms that "[c]ourt decisions, Commission rules and enforcement actions, and accounting and auditing literature have all considered 'qualitative' factors"o 10 bearing on materiality. In addition, the Exchange Act, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,111 provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements, defined as "a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items." The forward-looking safe harbor, which several firms in our study cited in their disclosure statements, 112 shields firms from investor liability 104. Id. at 2. Regulation FD disclosure timing is dictated by 17 C.F.R. § 243.100, which provides that when material nonpublic information is disclosed to certain persons it must be disclosed to the public simultaneously when it is intentionally disclosed and promptly when unintentionally disclosed. 
B. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Two financial accounting standards are relevant to the financial reporting after ACA: FAS 106, accounting for postretirement benefits, and FAS 109, accounting for income taxes. These standards are now codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) in ASC 715-60, CompensationRetirement Benefits-Defined Benefit Plans-Other Postretirement and ASC 740-Income Taxes, respectively.
113
When FAS 106 was first issued, it effected a significant change in employers' accounting for postretirement benefits other than pensions. Until the early 1990s, employers accounted for postretirement benefit expenses, including retiree drug plans, on a cash or pay-as-you-go basis, meaning that the costs of those benefits were not reported as expenses until they were actually paid out to retirees. 14 FAS 106 instead required accrual-basis accounting, even for deferred benefits. Accrual-basis accounting "attempts to recognize the events of noncash transactions and events as they occur." 11 5
Accordingly, employers must recognize the expected cost of future benefits for employees and their beneficiaries and dependents during the years in which each employee renders the services necessary to earn the postretirement benefits. Thus, when FAS 106 was issued, firms recorded large liabilities for their future benefit payments and began reporting current expenses for future payments of postretirement benefits. After this change in accounting treatment, there was a significant drop in the percentage of companies offering retirement benefits. 116 These requirements are now codified in ASC 715-60.
Second, ASC 740 (initially issued as FAS 109) governs the reporting of tax positions for financial statement purposes. When differences arise between the tax and accounting treatments for a transaction (book-tax difference), ASC 740 requires firms to record the value of these differences as deferred tax assets or liabilities. For example, firms with net operating losses (NOLs) may use these NOLs to offset future taxable income. This book-tax difference creates a deferred tax asset because a future tax payment is lower due to the anticipated use of the NOL. Conversely, deferred tax liabilities are created when book-tax differences give rise to future tax liabilities. Because ASC 740 does not employ discounting for the time-value of money, which may result in larger present-day write-offs. For example, a deferred tax asset available in 40 years has a relatively small present value in economic terms, but the financial statement reflects the value as if the benefit or liability were due in the current period. That accounting makes for a larger balance than would occur if discounting factors were applied (as in other accounting treatments for pensions and debt). When the tax benefits were provided through the MMvA in 2003, firms recognized a deferred tax asset for the future tax benefits. Upon enactment of ACA in 2010, these same firms were required to reverse the entry and eliminate the deferred tax asset for the amount of benefit previously recorded.
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This study examined the proposition that firms' SEC disclosures reporting the effects of the RDS tax change in the ACA were politically motivated. Our analysis confirms and amplifies the House Committee's conclusions, demonstrating with a more comprehensive dataset that employers' post-ACA disclosures were both required and proper. The disclosures may have had a double-effect of carrying a political message, but that does not undermine their accuracy.
We derived our sample by cataloguing employers' 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K statements reporting financial impact due to the RDS tax change for the quarter after ACA's enactment. We then analyzed the data in terms of disclosure venue, narrative statements on the disclosures, disclosure amount, industry type, firm size, and lobbying history to reveal any patterns suggesting purely political motivation. We also examined market response to the disclosures. SEC filings are mandatory for firms whose financial results are materially impacted by any event, making it difficult to isolate political motivation as a factor. We note, however, that the unique reportability of the RDS tax change allowed firms a rare opportunity to make a political statement through SEC disclosures. The government's attempt to suppress this and similar corporate speech could undermine the availability and reliability of such disclosures.
A. Sample Identification
To identify our sample, we searched the LexisNexis SEC Filings Library Employers United possible write-offs prior to enactment, but we did not identify any early disclosures. We searched through the end of July 2010 to capture the last quarter-end date that would include March 23 events. I0-Qs are due 40 to 45 days after quarter end; therefore, a March to May fiscal quarter would be filed at or near the end of July 2010. A January to March fiscal quarter would be filed earlier.
Our primary search terms were 'plan d' within 5 words of 'subsidy' and 'medicare."' We tested several additional terms including "retiree," "hr 3590," "affordable care act," "tax treatment part d," "retiree drug subsidy," and "patient protection." These searches returned fewer relevant documents and no additional companies.
Our searches identified 203 companies that specifically mentioned the RDS provision of the ACA. Of these, 19 mentioned elimination of the Part D subsidy only to state that it did not affect the company, usually because the company did not provide qualifying benefits or receive the subsidy.11
9 Thirteen companies reported that elimination of the subsidy was immaterial to their financial results.1 20 Another 16 companies appear to have received the subsidy but did not provide an amount or any indication of why they failed to provide an amount.1 2 1 We presumed these amounts were We are evaluating the long-term impacts of this legislation to us. It is difficult to estimate the impact due to the nature of our workforce, the various years in which certain provisions become applicable, and the fact that additional regulatory and rule setting guidance will be occurring. Our initial estimate is that we will incur an additional $50 to $65 million of annual expense beginning in 2011, which is primarily due to the multiple coverage provisions of the legislation which require the expansion of dependent coverage to age 26, among other requirements. Todd Shipyards Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) n.8 (July 4, 2010), available at typically small or immaterial. Seven companies reported a write-off, but not the amount written off because the accounting for the write-off did not affect net income. 122 Finally, one company reporting a small write-off ($100,000) was not in the Compustat database from which we drew supporting financial information and, accordingly, was eliminated from further consideration. 123 In sum, our analysis consists of 147 unique companies reporting the specific dollar effect of the elimination of deductibility of the Part D RDS subsidy. 124 Write-off against allowance-amount not reported (7)
Company not in Compustat database (1)
Companies analyzed 147
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98537/000009853710000027/formlOqfyl lql.htm. 122. This can happen for two reasons. First, some companies offset the elimination of the tax asset against a previously recorded allowance account rather than recording a current tax expense. That is, they already expected they would not benefit from the tax asset, typically because they did not expect to have sufficient future income. Owens Coming, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 22, 32 (Mar. 31, 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1370946/000119312510095732/dl0q.htm (referring to "financial results" as earnings in this context). The second reason earnings may be unaffected is because some utility companies are allowed to pass these additional taxes onto rate payers. In this case, when the tax asset is written off, the company records a "regulatory asset," essentially a receivable from future rate payers, rather than an expense. When companies in these situations did report the amount of the write-off, we retained them in our sample because future cash flows will be the same regardless of whether the write-offs reduced current earnings. For example, Westmoreland Coal wrote off a $7.2 million asset, and Media General wrote off a $1.7 million asset against valuation allowances. Both are included in our analysis.
123. See AMH Holdings, LLC (Form 10-Q) 9 (August 11, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/data/1289559/000095012310076101/cO4649el0vq.htm.
124. In identifying unique companies, we were careful to include only parent companies, and not both parents and subsidiaries reporting separately. A parent company's consolidated financial statements include its subsidiaries' results; therefore, including both would double count subsidiary write-offs. We were particularly careful to identify the correct reporting entity for utility companies, which often have complicated corporate structures.
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B. Disclosure Venue
To examine the proposition that the firms' SEC disclosures were politically motivated, we compared firms that disclosed write-offs on Form 8-K very soon after the ACA was enacted with firms that waited to report the write-off in scheduled SEC quarterly and annual reports. Our study revealed that 15 companies issued Form 8-Ks solely to report large write-offs, and an additional 50 companies discussed the write-offs on Form 8-Ks in the context of quarterly earnings reports.
We anticipated that Form 8-K disclosures would operate as political speech venues more obviously than scheduled 10-Q and 10-K disclosures because of the rapid disclosure requirement and flexible materiality standard. The 8-K timeframe required firms to report the RDS tax changes the firm deemed material within four days of the President's signing of the ACA, on March 23, 2010, or the Reconciliation Act, on March 30, 2010, when the political debate over federal health reform was still very fresh in the public's mind. Moreover, fluidity in the materiality standard accords firms discretion regarding whether and how much of a financial impact to report. Firms could exercise greater discretion to report arguably non-material impacts (e.g., not within a five percent change in assets).
Of the 147 write-offs, 82 (56% of our sample) were reported in scheduled SEC periodic filings: Form 10-K annual reports or Form 10-Q quarterly reports. Most of these firms reported the write-off in their discussion of tax expenses. The other 65 firms (44% of our sample) reported the write-off on Form 8-K. Firms filed some of these Form 8-Ks specifically to announce the RDS-related write-off, but most firms disclosed Form 8-K write-offs in the context of quarterly earnings announcements or, in a few cases, other corporate disclosures. Within this group, some earnings announcements featured the write-off prominently, such as in the headline or first paragraph. In others, the firm discussed the write-off deeper in the text of the release. The table below provides the distribution of the disclosure venues and the write-off amounts associated with each category. In our sample, companies filing 8-Ks, as opposed to scheduled periodic filings, reported significantly higher write-offs. 8-K filers accounted for three-quarters (or about $3.8 billion) of the total $5 billion written off. Although more companies reported RDS write-offs in scheduled financial reports, the total amount those companies wrote off was less than half of the total reported in Form 8-Ks. In addition, the average write-off by 8-K filers was much higher ($58 million) compared to an average of $15.4 million by 1O-Q and 10-K filers.
The companies that issued real-time disclosures expressly for the purpose of announcing the RDS impacts wrote off the highest dollar amounts by any measure. Among the 65 companies filing 8-Ks, 15 issued the disclosures expressly to report the RDS write-off. These 15 companies wrote off the highest total, average, and median amounts. Indeed, these 15 companies alone wrote off over half of the total dollars for our entire sample of 147 companies ($2.6 billion of $5 billion total). Average write-offs for these companies were $175.4 million.
Eighteen additional companies reported the RDS on Form 8-Ks, among other corporate news (typically quarterly earnings results), and prominently featured the RDS tax change in the disclosure narrative. The companies that highlighted the RDS also wrote off relatively higher amounts than the remaining companies in our study. These companies wrote off an average of $31.5 million each, compared to an average of $17.9 million for the 32 additional 8-K filers that did not note the RDS prominently.
Finally, the write-off amounts disclosed in scheduled 10-K and 10-Q filings were smaller than the amounts reported in any Form 8-K filing group. The differences across these four disclosure groups are statistically significant (Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) p-value < 0.01).
This write-off pattern is consistent with companies' claims that they properly used Form 8-K to disclose "material" write-offs likely to be significant to shareholders. The pattern is also consistent with our expectation that 8-K filers may have had stronger political motivation than scheduled filers. Firms experiencing a larger financial impact as a result of the RDS tax change, specifically, and the ACA's enactment, generally, may have seized the Form 8-K as a unique speech venue to immediately signal their political objection to the ACA and to express concern over the impact of the new law on their finances and their employee benefits programs.
Possible support for the political motivation of 8-K filers is revealed through further analysis of these data. Interestingly, when we scaled the write-off amounts by the companies' assets or revenues, the statistically significant differences across disclosure groups disappeared. Regardless of the venue in which the write-offs were disclosed, the amounts represented, on average, .2% to .3% of firms' total assets, and .3% to .4% of revenues.1 25 Although the higher end of these ranges correspond to companies issuing Form 8-Ks, the differences are not statistically significant. Similarly, write-offs were less than .001% of market capitalization for all groups. Materiality is a relative concept; therefore, based on these comparisons, one could argue that the write-offs were not relatively more material for companies filing Form 8-Ks, despite the differences in absolute amounts. In other words, the 65 companies that issued Form 8-Ks may have seized upon the discretion to deem the change in tax treatment for the RDS "material" in 125. We use 2009 financial results as a basis for comparison because, for most companies, the write-offs affected the first quarter of 2010. Thus, balances at the end of 2009 were the most recently reported annual results at the companies that disclosed the write-offs.
order to make a political statement in the immediate wake of the ACA's enactment.
Setting aside for now the question whether the impact of the RDS change was more or less material for some firms in our sample, the amounts written off overall represented a considerable proportion of all of the companies' 2009 net income or loss. Separating companies with profitable and unprofitable years, and excluding one outlier, 126 the amounts written off represented about 6% of the prior year's net income, and, for companies reporting losses, nearly 11% of the loss. Companies were significantly more likely to feature the write-off prominently in their earnings releases when the amount was a larger proportion of the prior year's loss but not if it was a larger proportion of income. Overall, it appears that the absolute, but not the relative, amount of write-offs affected the choice of disclosure venue, and companies disclosing on Form 8-K have significantly larger write-offs than those that did not.
C. Company Demographics
We also studied whether the incidence of RDS write-offs correlated with certain industries or firm size to identify possible patterns of political motivation. We found that write-offs were concentrated in the telecommunications, manufacturing, and utilities industries and among larger companies with more employees. These results are consistent with historical patterns of industry types and firm sizes offering retiree health insurance benefits. Such employers are likely both to experience more material financial impacts as a result of the RDS tax change and to have greater political interest in federal regulation of retiree benefits.
Industry
Considering the distribution of firms in our sample across industries, telecommunication companies wrote off the largest share of the total $5 billion: $2.2 billion (43%). A close second was the manufacturing industry, with $1.9 billion (38%).
126.
For the loss analysis, we excluded Gaylord Entertainment. It wrote off $800,000, more than 34 times the net loss of $23,000 it reported in 2009, per Compustat. Gaylord disclosed the write-off in a scheduled quarterly report. See Gaylord Entertainment (Form 10-Q) n.12 (May 6, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/ Archives/edgar/data/1040829/000095012310046457/g23246elOvq.htm.
Utilities companies were a distant third, writing off $0.5 billion (9%). 127 Furthermore, in each of these industries, the proportion of companies reporting write-offs was statistically higher than would be expected if the write-offs were randomly distributed. 128 We were not especially surprised by those findings. All three industries include highly unionized companies. Unionized industries are both more likely to offer retiree health benefits and less able to reduce or offset the costs of those benefits due to long-term union contracts. 129 Our data roughly correlate with employer health benefits survey data indicating that 19% of manufacturing firms, 30% of agriculture, mining, and construction firms, and 47% of transportation, communication, and utilities firms offer retiree health benefits. 130 Only four percent of the dollars written off in our sample were attributed to finance firms, a somewhat surprising finding given that the employer benefits survey found that 42% of finance firms (the second largest group, exceeded only by public sector employers) offer retiree benefits. .html (suggesting that companies likely to be hardest hit by RDS tax change "are unionized and offer better retiree benefits than are available under Medicare"); Maher et al., supra note 51 (noting that the RDS change "is expected to affect primarily industrial companies with retirees represented by collective bargaining pacts, whose benefits are more difficult for companies to cut"); CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 163 (noting characteristics of large employers offering retiree health benefits, including union workers, older workers, full-time workers, and higher wage level).
130. CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 162 (showing data on firms offering health benefits to active workers, and the percentage of firms offering retiree health benefits, by industry).
131. Id. Closer examination of the dollars-by-industry breakdown provides additional insights. First, the nine communications firms wrote off the highest total amount, but the legislation affected far more manufacturing firms, 72 in total. The average amount written off by communications firms was $240.2 million, compared to only $26.9 million for manufacturing firms. The communications firms' average is skewed by the extraordinarily large write-offs by two companies, AT&T ($995 million) and Verizon ($962 million)-two companies that were subjects of congressional investigation. The next highest communications company write-off was by Qwest, at only $113 million. With AT&T and Verizon removed from the sample, the average communications company write-off was $29.2 million, much closer to the manufacturing companies' average.
Manufacturing is a broad industry encompassing many activities and products. Within manufacturing, capital goods producers accounted for most of the write-offs. This sub-industry includes Caterpillar and Deere & Co., the two other companies the House Committee investigated. Combined, 20 capital goods manufacturers wrote off $725 million total, more than one-third of the manufacturing total. The second highest total was accrued by pharmaceutical manufacturers, which includes six companies that wrote of a total of $584.5 million. The third highest manufacturing sub-industry included 20 material manufacturers that wrote off a total of $299.9 million. Another industry represented significantly in our sample was utilities. Our data include 34 utilities companies that wrote-off RDS tax assets totaling $457 million, putting the utilities industry in third place behind telecommunications and manufacturing for total assets written off. The utilities totals are somewhat unique, however, because the additional costs are often passed directly onto utilities customers (rate-payers). Accordingly, the loss of the tax asset often resulted in a new regulatory asset (a receivable from future rate payers) rather than a reduction in earnings. It is possible that additional utilities companies, not included in our sample, did not report the write-offs because there was no effect on current earnings. Nevertheless, utilities companies were statistically overrepresented among write-off companies.
Finally, although we found that the finance industry accounted for only four percent of the write-offs and that the number of finance firms reporting write-offs was statistically underrepresented, the average write-off per financial company was quite high. Only nine finance companies reported RDS write-offs, meaning that the $209.3 million total written off by these firms represents an industry average of $23.3 million, quite a bit higher than the $13.4 million utilities average. These data suggest that finance firms that do offer retiree benefits tend to offer relatively generous benefits.
In sum, the industry data do not suggest a particular political motivation among the more highly represented industries. Rather, these industries tend to provide retiree health benefits at higher rates and more generous packages than other industries. It is expected that those industries would experience greater (i.e., more material) financial impact due to the change in tax treatment for the RDS subsidy and would have greater political stakes in the new law. Those interests readily explain these firms' motivation for issuing SEC disclosure statements.
Size
To assess the association between company size and write-offs, we considered the number of people employed by the firms and two financial measures of company size: market capitalization and book value of assets. Both are consistent with larger firms reporting larger write-offs and do not suggest that larger firms are more likely to make politically motivated disclosures than smaller firms.
a. Number ofEmployees
On average, the write-off companies in our sample employed 31,000 workers as of 2009. This compares to an average of about 9000 employees for other Compustat companies. Not surprisingly, total write-offs are highly correlated with the number of employees (correlation is .59, p-value <.01), and companies with more employees wrote off the largest amounts.
[Vol. 38:2 Average write-offs for firms with 25,000 or more employees exceeded $100 million. Firms with 10,000 to 25,000 employees wrote off about $20 million. The average writeoff per employee was $1572, and the range was from about $5 to around $15,000.134 By way of comparison, in 2012, retiree-only health benefit plan (including comprehensive, not just prescription drug plans) annual premiums averaged $8419 for retirees under age 65, and $4511 for Medicare-eligible retirees over age 65. Employers typically cover 50% or less of those annual premium costs.
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There were significant differences in per-employee expenses across industries. On average, the seven mining and construction firms and the 33 utilities firms wrote off more than $3000 per employee. Medians and maximums were also highest for these industries, indicative of generous plans for these highly unionized industries. The next highest amounts were in the communication and financial industries, which averaged nearly $2000 per employee. In contrast, the wholesale and retail industries wrote off an average of just $264 per employee. The industry differences are statistically significant (ANOVA p-value < .01).
134. National Fuel Gas Company (NFG) had the highest per-employee write-off ($15,393 per employee). NFG is a New York utility that reported 1949 full-time employees at the end of 2009, see National Fuel Gas Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 70145/000095012309066226/137851elOvk.htm, and wrote off tax assets of either $27.5 million or $30 million, as reported in the company's 10-K and 10-Q, respectively. National Fuel Gas Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/000095012310108604/ 140830el0vk.htm; National Fuel Gas Company, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http:M/sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/000095012310074068/0000950123-10-074068-index.htm. This write-off did not affect eamings because the amount was added to rate-payers' obligations. The second highest per-employee write-off was about $9500. Employee data were unavailable for two sample companies.
135. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 6, at 8 (showing annual premiums in both categories and employer and employee shares of premiums).
As expected, higher per-employee amounts were associated with more prominent SEC disclosures. Excluding the outlier discussed previously,1 36 the next table reveals that the average per-employee write-off is highest when companies issued Form 8-K solely to disclose the write-off or when the write-off is prominent in the earnings announcement. Median differences are significant (p-value = 0.01). This result is consistent with prior analyses indicating that companies used Form 8-K to disclose relatively material write-offs.
b. Assets and Market Capitalization
On average, our sample consists of relatively large companies. For fiscal year 2009, the average assets for our sample were $26.5 billion, revenues were $11.6 billion, and market capitalization was $13.2 billion. These data compare to average assets of $12.3 billion, revenues of $3 billion, and market capitalization of only $3.1 billion for other Compustat companies during the relevant time period.1 37 Consistent with this analysis, 53% of our sample companies are in Standard & Poor's S&P 500 Index, representing 15% of all Index companies. 138 That said, some of the companies we included in our sample are relatively small; the smallest company reported assets of $78 million and revenues of $83 million, and medians are much smaller than averages for all groups, suggesting that a few larger companies drove up the overall averages. The companies in our sample were also relatively profitable. Of those companies, 82% reported net income (as opposed to net losses), compared to 54% of other Compustat companies. The average return on assets (ROAs) for the write-off companies was about 3%, after adjusting for outliers, while the similarly adjusted average for other Compustat companies was close to -7%. 139 The write-offs declined predictably with firm size. Again, these results were unsurprising as larger firms are better able to bear the costs of both active employee and retiree health plans and therefore more likely to offer such benefits. Also, the tax impact of the RDS change would more likely be "material" on larger firms.
In sum, firm demographics suggest little about the political motivation behind firms' RDS-related SEC disclosures. Any trends in industry type or firm size are as readily explained by historical patterns of firms offering retiree benefits. Larger, longer established, and unionized companies are more likely to offer those benefits. Accordingly, those firms are more likely to report a material impact on expected earnings as a result of the change in tax treatment to the RDS following enactment of the ACA. At the same time, those firms are more likely to have a political interest in the federal health reforms Congress is enacting.
D. Lobbying and Subsequent SEC Disclosure
In another attempt to identify possible political motivation for the SEC disclosures, we looked at the lobbying history of the firms in our sample. We found that firms that lobbied on the ACA were almost twice as likely to issue 8-Ks related to the RDS issue and wrote off significantly higher amounts, on average, than non-lobbying firms.
139. This average is calculated after excluding companies with the highest and lowest five percent of ROAs from each group. These extreme ROAs are excluded because outliers can have a significant effect on the average. For example, companies with very few assets often have extremely high or low ROAs as the denominator approaches zero.
The Journal of Corporation Law
Of the 147 write-off companies, 43 lobbied on the ACA.1 4 0 The average write-off for those 43 firms was $92.5 million, compared to a much lower average of $10.2 million for non-lobbying firms. As shown in Table 8 , medians and totals were also significantly higher. In addition, among the 43 lobbyists, 27 (or 63%) issued 8-Ks related to the RDS issue. By comparison, among the 103 non-lobbyists, only 38 (or 37%) issued 8-Ks. Finally, lobbying was much more prevalent among firms that issued a Form 8-K solely for the purpose of disclosing the write-off. There is also considerable anecdotal evidence of lobbying around the proposed RDS tax change. 14 1 As the Minority Committee memorandum details, several companies wrote to members of Congress during the health reform debate, explaining that the proposed provision would require them to take substantial write-offs if the nondeductibility provision passed.1 42 Also, industry representative organizations, including most notably the American Benefits Council, followed the RDS tax change issue closely, taking out full-page advertisements in Politico and Roll Call. . 5, 2013 ). This source does not detail whether the firms lobbied for or against that ACA, or the provisions on which they focused their lobbying efforts.
141. See King, supra note 129 ("Some of the biggest employers in the U.S. are warning that a provision in the Senate's proposed health-care overhaul could lead to cuts in retiree benefits and a sharp reduction in reported earnings next year.").
142. See Minority Memo, supra note 81, at 2-3 (noting that all four investigated companies signed letters to members of Congress warning of the impact of the change); see, e.g., Letter from James Bell et al. to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader, and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Dec. 11, 2009 ), available at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/docurnents/hcr-drugsub-cfo-letterl21109.pdf (citing concerns about the impact of the proposed Medicare Part D subsidy; seven of the ten signatories to the letter were firms in our dataset, including Boeing, Caterpillar, Con-way, Inc., Deere & Co., Met Life, Verizon, and Xerox). 
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Employers United
The apparent correlations between lobbying and both disclosure venue and disclosure amount could suggest that Form 8-K filers were particularly politically motivated in issuing real-time disclosures in the wake of the ACA. But the preceding analysis offers alternative, equally plausible explanations. Firms experiencing greater financial impact due to the RDS tax change were more likely to identify that event as material, thus triggering the Form 8-K disclosure requirement. Moreover, firms that historically provided more generous retiree drug benefits through the RDS could readily have anticipated the financial impact of the non-deductibility proposal. The issue would have been on these firms' political radar screens during congressional debates, providing a rational basis for lobbying against the change in tax treatment. The fact that these firms were both politically opposed to the law and financially obligated to report the effect of the change in the law does not suggest improper political motive in filing the 8-K disclosures.
E. Market Nonresponse
For reasons explained below, the 147 sample firms' SEC disclosure statements, writing off a total of $5 billion against 2010 expected earnings, did not produce a statistically significant market response. Such startlingly large earnings write-offs from numerous S&P 500 firms might be expected to cause a decrease in market values at the time of the disclosures. Alternatively, if the market viewed the firms' political statements expressing criticism of the ACA favorably, an increase in market values at the time of disclosure would be plausible. 144 We found neither of these effects.
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The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 38:2 long") or sell ("go short") on contracts/trades on the outcome of specific future events. Intrade contracts payout $10 if the event occurs; otherwise the payout is $0. The trades are priced between $0 and $100, meaning that each point is equivalent to $.10 (100 points/$10). 146 The results of daily trades can be interpreted as the market's assessment of the likelihood of a given event occurring. On January 19, 2010, Intrade opened a trading market for "OBAMACARE.PASS.JUNIO,"l 47 described as "'Obamacare' health reform to become law before midnight ET June 30, 2010."148 On March 4, 2010, the probability of ACA enactment exceeded 50% for the first time since congressional consideration of the legislation began, with trading prices ranging from $39 to $89.9 on that volatile day. In the subsequent ten days, closing prices hovered between $45 and $65. By March 19, two days before passage, and four days before President Obama signed it into law, the probability of ACA enactment reached 80%, suggesting that the market anticipated passage and had time to price in the likely effects of the new legislation. 149 Accordingly, the market showed no statistically significant response to passage, or to firms' postpassage SEC disclosures. In effect, the market had already absorbed the information regarding the expected financial impact of the RDS tax change. issued. 15 1 To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the market returns for the 15 firms issuing Form 8-Ks solely for the purpose of reporting the write-off. We focused on these disclosures for two reasons: first, as discussed above,1 52 these tend to be the largest write-offs and are most likely to trigger significant reactions. Second, because these Form 8-Ks provided information exclusively about the RDS-related write-offs, it is reasonable to attribute the market response to that news. By contrast, for the Form 8-Ks that also included other earnings news, it is difficult to disentangle the impetus for the response.
Our analysis employed cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We used price data from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) and the Eventus Event Study statistical program to calculate the returns for each of these 15 companies over a two-day event window, beginning on the date the company filed the Form 8-K and continuing through the next trading day.1 53 For each of the 15 companies, Eventus estimated the abnormal return on the date that the 8-K was filed (day zero) and the trading date immediately after (day one). We estimated the abnormal return by subtracting the average overall market return for the day from the daily return for the disclosing company. This procedure removed the portion of the company's return due to general market activity, leaving the idiosyncratic return for the particular firm. Conceptually, one could consider any abnormal return a function of new information specific to the disclosing company. We cumulated the abnormal returns for the two-day event window by summing. Next, we used a t-test to assess whether the abnormal returns for the 15 firms, either individually or in aggregate, were significantly different from zero. If not, then the disclosures did not have significant effects on the stock prices of the disclosing firms. This analysis revealed that the market response with respect to the studied firms was not statistically significant. As the Intrade analysis suggested, information about the effect of the RDS tax change and the potential write-offs was already impounded in the market price.
It is not surprising that this information was already publicly available. As noted above, 154 several of the firms in our sample lobbied against the change and advised elected officials and government officials that they would be required to take the writeoffs if Congress enacted the new RDS non-deductibility rule. 152. See supra Part IV.B (describing disclosure venue and amounts written off). 153. The two-day window allows for either a disclosure filed after market close or an otherwise incomplete reaction to the Form 8-K news on the date of filing. We also consider a three-day window (days -1 to 1) to allow for news leakage prior to the filing date. Results are unchanged.
Prediction Market for Supreme Court ACA Decision
154. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting corporate opposition to health care reform). As demonstrated, the trading prices are related with an increased correlation as time passed. By early March 2012, the two markets were trading at nearly identical prices, but still below 40.159 After three days of oral arguments on the case in late March, however, Intrade's betting shifted dramatically, climbing to over 60.160 Traders perceived the tone and extent of the Justices' questioning and the attorneys' responses to favor the side challenging the mandate's constitutionality. 16 1 On June 27, 2012, the day before the Supreme Court's decision, the December 2012 market traded at $69.5, and the December 2013 market traded at $71.7.162 Because the trading volume was high (over 11,000 trades in the three-day window around the Court's announcement), these results cannot be attributed to a few outliers moving the market. 163 To the surprise of many, including the Intrade prediction market, the Supreme Court, on July 28, 2012, upheld the mandate under the federal taxing power. 164 Thus, it appears that the market assessed, with moderate success, the likelihood of ACA passage, but failed to predict the Supreme Court's individual mandate decision. The Court's firm nondisclosure policy regarding cases pending before it may have caused this error.
165 By contrast, the public legislative process surrounding the ACA's enactment allowed for much greater information sharing. While the Justices signaled the date of the ruling,1 66 reliable information, analogous to the legislative votes and lobbying activity surrounding the ACA enactment that would clearly signal the Court's expected outcome remained significantly less transparent. It is likely that media and popular sentiment over the anticipated outcome likely swayed the prediction market for the Supreme Court's decision, especially given the scarcity of other authoritative sources. 167 V. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS Our findings, based on a comprehensive study of 147 firms' post-ACA SEC disclosures reporting adverse financial impact as a result of the RDS tax change, are consistent with the congressional committee's conclusions regarding four companies' dramatic Form 8-K disclosures.
16 8 At first blush, a prominent company's publicly filed statement, issued immediately upon the ACA's enactment, reporting a jaw-dropping $1 billion write-off, might appear to be nothing more than a political statement against "Obamacare." But, if not strictly required by law, AT&T's and other companies' disclosures were certainly permitted under the SEC's flexible standards for reporting "material" changes. In addition, the calculations of 2010 current-year write-offs, representing already-deferred tax benefits, were consistent with FAS rules.
Our study took a deeper, more comprehensive look at the SEC disclosures that triggered the aborted congressional inquiry. We included not just real-time Form 8-K disclosures filed immediately after the ACA was enacted, but also scheduled periodic filings (Forms 10-Q and 10-K) filed in the relevant quarter following enactment. 169 Attempting to reveal political motivation for the RDS-related disclosures, we sorted the data through various filters, including disclosure venue (by both amount disclosed per venue and primary purpose of the disclosure), industry type, firm size (by both number of employees and assets/market capitalization), and lobbying history of the sample firms. We also considered market response to the disclosures to see whether the disclosing firms experienced a loss (due to the adverse financial reports) or gain (indicating support for their political statements) in share value upon release of their SEC filings.
In each analysis, our findings did not suggest primary political motivation. The results were readily explained by SEC disclosure standards (e.g., firms experiencing larger financial impacts tended to deem the RDS change "material," thereby triggering the 8-K filing), industry trends (e.g., larger, more established, and unionized industries tend to provide retiree benefits at higher rates than other industries, thereby experiencing greater financial impact from the RDS change), or rational self-interest in the new law (e.g., firms that lobbied on the ACA, generally, and RDS, specifically, had larger financial stakes in the legislation than firms that did not). Those conclusions aside, we recognize that the RDS-related SEC disclosures may serve dual purposes as compelled, regulated speech and a form of corporate political speech.
A. Uniquely Reportable Event
The RDS tax change offered a uniquely reportable event that companies opposing federal health care reform could use to signal objection to the ACA in the days immediately following the law's enactment.
170 A perfect storm of factors created this opportunity. No other provision of the ACA required firms to take an immediate charge against 2010 expected earnings. The combined operation of accounting standards and SEC disclosure requirements rendered the RDS tax change a uniquely reportable event. Unlike any other ACA provision applicable to employers, the elimination of deductibility for the RDS subsidy required firms to recognize an immediate financial impact in the form of a non-cash charge against expected earnings in the same quarter as the ACA's earnings totaling $3.4 billion, compared to our comprehensive total of 147 companies, totaling $5 billion in write-offs. See Pear, supra note 65 (noting that companies cannot quantify benefits until the law is enacted).
170. In game theory, signaling is a strategy used by repeat players to communicate willingness to cooperate. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 18-20 (2000) (using game theory to describe how "good" and "bad" types interact in a prisoner's dilemma scenario); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 768 (1998) (describing the signaling model, labeling game citizens of the high type as "cooperators" and the low type as "cheaters"). Players can be grouped into two types: "good," or cooperative, types who value the future highly relative to the present and are willing to wait for future payoffs, and "bad," or opportunistic, types who seek payoffs in the present, even if it means sacrificing future payoffs. The more one discounts the future, the less likely one is to forego the immediate benefit gained from defection ("good" types). Accordingly, players attempt to identify other "good" types with low discount rates. The model assumes that a person knows his type but does not know the types of others. To distinguish themselves from "bad" types and identify cooperative partners, "good" types engage in actions called signals, which refer to any behavior that is observable and has an associated cost. Id. The 147 firms identified in our study could be seen as taking the opportunity of SEC disclosures to signal to other "good" types their willingness to forego the immediate benefits of stable earnings expectations in order to derive the future benefits of a sustained cooperative relationship toward repeal or revision of the ACA's new burdens on employers.
[Vol. 38:2enactment. 171 Moreover, accounting standards allowed firms to calculate extraordinarily high estimated write-offs, which made the impact of their disclosures especially salient as political statements against the ACA.
First, FAS 106 (now codified as ASC 715-60) affected a significant change in employers' accounting for post-retirement benefits other than pensions. 172 The new standard requires accrual-basis, rather than pay-as-you-go, accounting. Accordingly, employers must report the expected cost of future benefits for employees and their beneficiaries and dependents during the years the employee renders the services necessary to earn the benefits. 173 FAS 106 means that firms must include the cost of prescription drug benefits payable to current retirees, as well as expected costs of benefits to be paid to future retirees, in their current earnings statements. 174 Second, FAS 109 (now codified as ACS 740) requires firms to recognize deferred tax assets and liabilities resulting from a change in tax laws or rates in the year of enactment.
175 Accordingly, firms are required to take a noncash charge against current earnings, reflecting the entire present value of the deferred tax benefits.
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By contrast, other ACA provisions affecting employers, including the increased costs of covering more employees and dependents due to pay-or-play penalties, default enrollment for employers with 200 or more employees, and extension of dependent child coverage to age 26; increased costs for additional benefits due to ACA's coverage mandates; and costs associated with new reporting, disclosure, and accounting requirements surely will impact companies' future earnings statements. 177 But those financial impacts can be incorporated into earnings forecasts or otherwise reported when the provisions take effect. None of those provisions required adjustments to firms' 2010, current-year expected earnings. Even the "Cadillac Tax," a 40% excise tax on high-cost health that will take effect in 2018,178 would not trigger current adjustments to expected earnings unless firms begin modifying their current plans to avoid the future tax. 7 9 By contrast, firms had already included the tax benefit expected from the RDS subsidy in their 2010 first-quarter earnings statements.
Third, SEC Form 8-K requires "rapid and current" 180 disclosure of material changes in a company's financial condition or operations, as quickly as four days after specific extraordinary events occur. 18 change in tax treatment for the RDS subsidy material to their finances were required to report the impact very soon after either the final enactment of the ACA or the Reconciliation Act. 182 Fourth, the materiality standard allows business judgment in determining which events are material and, therefore, reportable. Materiality judgments are particularly nuanced when involving estimates or other items incapable of precise measurement, items for which there is lack of clear authority on appropriate accounting methodologies, and forward-looking statements.
183 All of those considerations were applicable to firms' estimated future costs and tax liabilities for retiree benefit plans. Most firms included in our study experienced a quantitatively material impact as a result of the RDS tax change. However, even firms that reported minimal financial impact might still deem the change qualitatively material and therefore reportable. Analysts are not capable of precisely estimating future retiree drug benefit costs given: 1) fluctuations in prescription drug costs over time; 2) potential changes in enrollment levels, should retirees opt for coverage on the exchanges or in Medicare Part D; and 3) life expectancy of retirees and other beneficiaries and dependents.
Moreover, the SEC recognizes that, in some cases, "reasonable minds may differ about the appropriate accounting treatment of a financial statement item,"
1 84 which could lead to reasonably different interpretations of materiality. 185 The House Committee highlighted the lack of consensus on the appropriate accounting methodology for future RDS tax liabilities, in relation to the expected duration of the benefits. 186 Standard accounting practices suggest that firms calculate the present value of taxes they will pay over the estimated lifetimes of current and future retirees who are expected to receive the benefits. Accordingly, some companies calculated future losses out over a very long period of time (in one case to "infinity"), suggesting that they expected to continue offering prescription benefits without any abatement. 187 Other firms applied more conservative estimates of 30 years, perhaps reflecting the current reality that many employers are reducing or eliminating retiree benefits. Either approach, however, seems acceptable under accounting standards.
B. Government Regulation of Corporate Political Speech
This study develops an important subplot in the saga that has been the passage of, and challenges to, the ACA-the Obama Administration's attempts (and failures) to day, the Supreme Court accepted the challengers' arguments, articulating a novel limit on the federal power to regulate existing activity, but not to compel new activity, as a means of regulating interstate commerce.1 93 The Administration, in the end, prevailed on the individual mandate challenge, albeit on a different legal theory,1 94 and also succeeded in salvaging much of the Medicaid program. 195 Yet Administration spokespersons were notably circumscribed in their response; they did not trumpet the Court's decision or seize the opportunity to turn the tide of negative public opinion.
The SEC disclosure controversy regarding RDS-related write-offs, which this study examined closely, was among the Administration's first fumbled attempts to control the political message around the ACA. Congressional and Administration officials pounced on the high-dollar public filings as political statements asserting that the ACA would be bad for businesses and bad for employer-based health insurance, contrary to the Administration's own predictions that the ACA would actually lower health care costs in the long run. 196 After a relatively brief investigation, the congressional committee called off the hearing, concluding that the firms' disclosures were proper, if misleading.1 9 7
Other Administration attempts to manage the message around the ACA are still playing out. Two regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will compel, rather than attempt to suppress, corporate speech. The compelled speech regulations aim, at least in part, to raise public opinion of the ACA. Specifically, the ACA requires health insurance companies to disclose certain pricing and profit information to health insurance customers. HHS contends that these disclosure requirements will increase transparency and accountability.1 98 However, regulators also about the MLR requirement. 2 16 The notice will direct enrollees to the HHS website for further information about the insurer's specific MLR.
2 17 HHS' rule spells out the precise language of the notice, which "must be prominently displayed in clear, conspicuous, 14-point bold type on the front of the plan document or as a separate notice." 2 18
These examples reveal a tension similar to the RDS write-off controversy. On the one hand, regulators seek to ensure availability of accurate, timely, reliable information regarding the financial status of regulated firms. On the other hand, the federal government seeks to control corporate political speech regarding essential public policy initiatives. In each example, the tension seems to resolve in favor of accurate disclosure and against speech regulation. In the example of constitutional challenges to the minimum essential coverage requirement, the legal merits prevailed over the perceived political rhetoric (at least for the commerce power argument). In the example of the post-ACA SEC disclosure controversy, which was the focus of our study, the firms' financial data and accounting standards prevailed over attempts by Congress and the Administration to politicize the issue. It remains to be seen whether the federal government will be successful in its more recent attempts to compel corporate political speech by health insurers in order to boost public opinion of the ACA. The compromise version of the MLR notice requirement is consistent with the observed pattern that integrity of regulated disclosures will prevail over attempts to politicize corporate speech. We conclude where we began: expressing concern for the government's potential to chill, distort, or otherwise discredit accurate financial disclosures by damning them as political gamesmanship.
VI. CONCLUSION
This empirical study of public companies' SEC disclosure statements in the immediate wake of the ACA's enactment offers novel insights for the regulation of corporate political speech and the integrity of financial disclosures. SEC Form 8-K, with its rapid disclosure policy and materiality trigger, offers a unique forum for political speech, both allowing and requiring firms to comment publicly on the financial impact of new legislation as soon as it is enacted. Despite the potential for SEC filings to have a double effect as political speech, we conclude that the government should exercise restraint in discrediting the disclosures as political and, therefore, improper. Just as regulators should not suppress otherwise accurate, required corporate disclosures because they tend to criticize government policies, they should exercise caution in compelling corporate speech to advance a political agenda.
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